[Cryptography] [cryptography] STARTTLS for HTTP

[Tony Arcieri]

On Sun, Aug 31, 2014 at 1:18 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule at gmail.com> wrote:

> In this model, we have a mode for unauthenticated encryption where an
> unverified cert is OK. It probably shouldn't reflect anything to the user
> and give the same "white" bar as normal plaintext HTTP. But it does add
> resilience against passive, blanket surveillance.
>
> https certificate verification UX "research" (since the warnings given to
> users seem to constantly be in flux) can continue as-is and unabated by the
> addition of STARTTLS for HTTP. It should be completely transparent (except
> to the passive surveillers)
>

There have been many, many comments about how plaintext HTTP is actually
better than STARTTLS. I hope, those of you who made these comments, really
pause and consider how they reflect on you.

Comments like this:

https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/54648/does-http-support-encryption-without-https-like-starttls

"Generally speaking, nobody uses STARTTLS for HTTP, mostly because it is *less
secure*."

This comment was made by Tom Leek:

https://security.stackexchange.com/users/5411/tom-leek

I don't think Tom Leek understands that, if STARTTLS is enabled for HTTP
users in a purely transparent manner, and doesn't affect the perceived UX,
then his complaints are completely irrelevant, and there are positive steps
in the direction of privacy.

-- 
Tony Arcieri
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