[Cryptography] Open Source Sandboxes to Enforce Security on Proprietary Code?

[Ben Laurie]

On 24 August 2014 04:36, Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> wrote:
> A fascinating bit of work on the inverse problem:  Running an application securely under a hostile OS:  http://sva.cs.illinois.edu/pubs/VirtualGhost-ASPLOS-2014.pdf
>
> Basic idea:  Use virtualization techniques on a process-by-process level.  The hypervisor considers every page of memory to be in of two states:  Accessible to a particular process; accessible to the OS.  On the transition from process to OS, encrypt and checksum it; on the transition back, verify and decrypt.  So the OS can screw up a process - but can't see any of its actual data.
>
> There's obviously much more to it than that, but it's really clever stuff.  In a way, you can think of this as taking the very old idea of the security kernel into the modern era by completely divorcing it from the OS.

Surely this is not the inverse problem - it's the same one - the
presence of a hypervisor makes the OS just more code that can be
sandboxed,