[Cryptography] Cost of creating huge theft targets [Was: Cost of remembering a password]

Benjamin Kreuter brk7bx at virginia.edu
Fri Aug 22 16:52:26 EDT 2014


On Thu, 2014-08-21 at 13:08 +0100, Dave Howe wrote:

> Surely they could (on demand from a LEO, if nothing else) push an extra
> key/replacement key out to all devices (or patch the code binary so that
> it encrypts to an additional key), so next time a device uploads, they
> have a backdoor? or am I missing something here?

That is not really a problem you can engineer around.  If you install
software updates -- and for good reasons we overwhelmingly advise
everyone to do so -- you run the risk that whoever provides those
updates will be compelled by their government to insert a backdoor.

-- Ben

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