[Cryptography] CSPRNG for password salt

[Erwan Legrand]

Jerry,

Le 20 août 2014 12:23, "Jerry Leichter" <leichter at lrw.com> a écrit :
> This is a rather weak argument.  You're contrasting a CSPRNG - something
that's quite difficult to build correctly, as we've seen from many
discussions on this list - with something as simple as "remember the last
one and add one to get the next".  We've had predictable "CSPRNG's" in the
past.
>
> If all you need for a salt is a value that won't be re-used, getting
software that guarantees that won't happen is a very minor problem.
Arguing for CSPRNG's *on the basis that solving that problem is a likely
source of weakness*, when there are *so* many much more complex things to
get right, makes no sense to me.
>

As I said, the target audience is web application developpers. These do not
write CSPRNG's. Yet many of them write authentication code using a crypto
toolkit.

Does this make sense now?

Erwan
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