[Cryptography] Dark Mail Alliance specs?
James A. Donald
jamesd at echeque.com
Tue Nov 26 21:38:01 EST 2013
On 2013-11-27 09:41, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Stephan Neuhaus <stephan.neuhaus at tik.ee.ethz.ch> writes:
>
>> In my opinion, massive user-controlled email encryption will not happen. Not
>> now, and not in the next ten years.
>
> My version of this (stolen from a comment by Vesselin Bontchev about user
> education for security): If mass-market secure email was going to work it
> would have worked by now.
Imagine skype as originally designed, (central authority maps public and
private keys to user names) plus a key continuity feature, plus the
seldom used option of doing a zero knowledge shared passphrase to detect
man in the middle.
The possibility that the zero knowledge check could be used would deter
powerful adversaries, even if seldom used in practice. The more
powerful, the greater the deterrent effect.
It is not totally end to end, central authority can listen in, but the
check would limit the amount of listening.
It can be made completely end to end for strong passwords. Assume login
is by zero knowledge password protocol, which means that the central
authority does not know the end user's password, for strong passwords.
The secret key is generated from the strong secret supplied by central
authority, plus the password.
When you change your password, you generate a certificate mapping your
new public key to your old public key, which certificate makes other
people's key continuity check happy.
If key continuity fails, people get a warning, but they don't have to
click it away, for that just trains people to click it away. They can
just continue right on and not pay attention to it.
Or they could use the zero knowledge shared passphrase procedure to
detect man in the middle.
So, if non paranoid, and using easy passwords, works like skype used to
work. No interception except by central authority, and central
authority cannot intercept everyone, or even large numbers of people.
If paranoid and using strong passwords, provides OTR like end to end
capability.
More information about the cryptography
mailing list