[Cryptography] DNSSEC = completely unnecessary?

[Ben Laurie]

On 6 November 2013 01:48, Paul Wouters <paul at cypherpunks.ca> wrote:
> That's a nonsense argument. Abuse of such powers, unlike the plethora of
> CA certs, would need to be world visible, that is untargetted. It would
> be very very visible. It is a huge win over CAcerts that can target
> individuals with specifically crafted signed certs.
>
> With dnssec, if the Government of Canada causes my nohats.ca to be
> modified (appear red on your above map), then my domain's public
> information changes. I would notice that. This is not an invisible
> MITM like some CA cert injection.

How did DNS get this magic un-MITM-able property?

Surely if the GoC wants to cause nohats.ca to be modified, for some
specific target(s), they can do that?