[Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation

James A. Donald jamesd at echeque.com
Tue Nov 5 16:44:59 EST 2013


On Nov 4, 2013, at 10:40 PM, James A. Donald <jamesd at echeque.com> wrote:
>> Since the hit came a long time after the message, it would not have
>> been useful in protecting the recipient from clicking on links to
>> phishing sites.\

On 2013-11-06 01:22, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> So you think it's all about *you*?  If a mechanism doesn't protect
 > *you*, *right now*, it's not a security mechanism?

If the point is to protect the population at large, the first step would 
be to detect spammed urls, not unique urls.

If spying on me to protect me from myself, need to interrupt immediately.

If spying on me to protect the population at large (which I violently 
object to) then should be hitting on non unique urls.

The observed behavior pattern only makes sense if they are spying on me 
for dangerous thoughts, racism, the wrong kind of Islam (those 
misunderstanders of Islam), sexism in the workplace, homophobia, or, as 
with General Petraeus, blackmail material that some of the political 
elite can use against others of the political elite.

The observed behavior pattern does not make sense if they are spying on 
me to protect me from myself, nor if they are spying on me to protect 
the general population from spam and phishing.

Spam and phishing, you look for non uniqueness.

Evil thoughts, you look for uniqueness.  The observed behavior pattern 
is that they are looking for unique urls, as Al Quaeda might use, or a 
general setting up a liaison might use.



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