[Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?

[Watson Ladd]

On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:39 PM, Albert Lunde <atlunde at panix.com> wrote:
> As a postscript to this thread, I'd note the existence of these older open
> source random number generation projects as an example of prior art:
>
> http://egd.sourceforge.net/
>
> http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
>
> The last revision of the prngd code is 2007. So while this is inspired by
> some good ideas it's not being actively developed today.
>
> They were developed to support Unix/Linux systems which didn't have a
> /dev/random /dev/urandom interface (a diminishing audience).
>
> They use the output of various commands to collect entropy, in a
> configurable-sized pool.
>
> I've used prngd in a previous context where I was administering a web
> server.
>
> A feature is that there is a trivial protocol for requesting random bytes in
> clear text over a TCP socket.
>
> I used that protocol to ship some random bytes from the primary web server
> via private fiber to the hot spare at another location which had little
> traffic.
>
> But our only use of random numbers there was for SSH, neither server used
> HTTPS.
I'ld like to note that Ivy Bridge includes an on-chip random number
generator, VIA has made chips with that support before,
and various embedded devices have also had random number generators.
What's wrong with just using them?

This whole conversation is as pointless as discussing the best way to
use a crowbar to open a can when a can opener is
sitting right next to the crowbar.
>
> --
>     Albert Lunde  albert-lunde at northwestern.edu
>                   atlunde at panix.com  (address for personal mail)
>
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Sincerely,
Watson

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