[Cryptography] how reliably do audits spot backdoors?

James A. Donald jamesd at echeque.com
Tue Dec 24 02:42:33 EST 2013


On 2013-12-24 04:33, Benjamin Kreuter wrote:
> I have been wondering for some time if this might be more a symptom of
> the languages we are using than a fundamental difficulty in the
> auditing process itself.  Quite a few UCC entries rely on undefined or
> counterintuitive behavior in C.

I find C quite intuitive, possibly as a result of having done a bit of 
code review.

What you would call counterintuitive, I read as idiomatic, and what is 
undefined, I read as unidiomatic.

So, the underhanded C examples would have failed code review, not 
because their terribly sneaky measures would have been detected in code 
review, but for being unidiomatic, obfuscated, uglified, or complexified.

The code review would have come to an end, and the developer ordered to 
do a rewrite, before the trick had been detected.




More information about the cryptography mailing list