[Cryptography] Passwords are dying - get over it

ianG iang at iang.org
Tue Dec 24 04:43:08 EST 2013


Hi Joe,

(thanks for the reminder, I needed to post on blog about MITB dual 
channel defences being broken.)

On 23/12/13 18:48 PM, Joe St Sauver wrote:

 > Kent commented:
> #and then, because they are so important they can force you to carry a
> #Bsafe fob, or something like that.  Actually, they probably won't go
> #for a fob...
>
> In Google's case, it's pretty clear that they're putting their
> bet on smart phones as their 2nd factor/2nd channel of choice.
> (See http://www.google.com/landing/2step/ )


Oops!   sorry 'bout dat!  Overtaken again:

    "    Zeus and other MITB trojans have used social engineering to 
bypass this process. When a user on an infected PC authenticates to a 
banking site using SMS authentication, the user is greeted by a 
webinject, similar to Figure 1. The webinject requires the installation 
of new software on the user’s mobile device; this software is in fact 
malware.

     ZitMo malware intercepts SMS TANs from the bank. Once greeted by 
the webinject on a Zeus-infected PC, the user enrolls by entering a 
phone number. A “security update” link is sent to the phone, and ZitMo 
installs when the link is clicked. Any bank SMS messages are redirected 
to a cyber criminal’s phone (all other SMS messages will be delivered as 
normal)."

My commentary:
http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/001464.html
New Report:
https://www.nsslabs.com/reports/view-precipice-mobile-financial-malware
Original 2006 MITB paper from Philipp Gühring:
http://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000758.html

> I've got a page that lists a variety of phone-based two factor
> authentication options at http://pages.uoregon.edu/joe/phone-2fa.html
> (if I've inadvertently overlooked anyone, please let me know and
> I'd be glad to add them to that page)


Nice page.  Perhaps that could be expanded to include precursors and 
attacks :)


iang



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