[Cryptography] Kindle as crypto hardware

[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

On Wed, Dec 4, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Tom Ritter <tom at ritter.vg> wrote:

> On 4 December 2013 00:57, Taral <taralx at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 3, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> > What I really want from a crypto key management device is that it be
>> >
>> > * Small and light
>> > * Have processor and display capabilities
>> > * Be possible to control the operating system build completely
>> > * Be cheap enough to be a burner machine
>>
>> Does it need to be resistant to physical attack?
>>
>
> Yes, I would add Tamper Evident.  I don't want to carry a key management
> device everywhere.  It _might_ be feasible if it was one of those stub usbs
> that are as small as the plug itself... but there goes the display.
>
> The question is, can tamper evident be grafted _onto_ a kindle easily and
> reliably?  Nearly all forms of tamper evidence have fallen to Defcon's
> Tamper Evident contest.  That doesn't mean they're worthless, because they
> increase attacker cost, but they can't be relied on fully.
>
> -tom
>

I stick stuff in a tamper evident bag. They are pretty cheap as the police
use them for evidence.

Even pro gear is not particularly tamper evident. I have had a safekeyper
apart and could probably do it again without loss of the keys now that I
know the position of the switch.


What is really desirable is to have the hardware zero itself if there is an
attempt to tamper with it. But that is not something I think is feasible
for any hardware that is not expensively purpose built.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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