Quantum Key Distribution: the bad idea that won't die...

[Alexander Klimov]

<http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2376>

  Unconditional security proofs of various quantum key
  distribution (QKD) protocols are built on idealized
  assumptions. One key assumption is: the sender (Alice) can
  prepare the required quantum states without errors. However,
  such an assumption may be violated in a practical QKD system.
  In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate a technically
  feasible "intercept-and-resend" attack that exploits such
  a security loophole in a commercial "plug & play" QKD system.
  The resulting quantum bit error rate is 19.7%, which is below
  the proven secure bound of 20.0% for the BB84 protocol.

-- 
Regards,
ASK

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