Possibly questionable security decisions in DNS root management

[Nicolas Williams]

Getting DNSSEC deployed with sufficiently large KSKs should be priority #1.

If 90 days for the 1024-bit ZSKs is too long, that can always be
reduced, or the ZSK keylength be increased -- we too can squeeze factors
of 10 from various places.  In the early days of DNSSEC deployment the
opportunities for causing damage by breaking a ZSK will be relatively
meager.  We have time to get this right; this issue does not strike me
as urgent.

OTOH, will we be able to detect breaks?  A clever attacker will use
breaks in very subtle ways.  A ZSK break would be bad, but something
that could be dealt with, *if* we knew it'd happened.  The potential
difficulty of detecting attacks is probably the best reason for seeking
stronger keys well ahead of time.

Nico
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