[Barker, Elaine B.] NIST Publication Announcements

dan at geer.org dan at geer.org
Thu Oct 1 11:52:21 EDT 2009


 > It is also completely impossible to prove you've deleted a
 > record. Someone who can read the record can always make a copy
 > of it. Cryptography can't fix the DRM problem.


If, and only if, the document lives solely within an
airtight surveillance system, then it is possible to
prove deletion.  Put differently, only within airtight
surveillance will the absence of evidence be the
evidence of absence.

In factually, if not politically, correct terms, the
Electronic Health Record is the surest path to a
surveillance state, but I digress.

--dan

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