full-disk subversion standards released

[Kent Yoder]

Hi Peter,

>>Apart from the obvious fact that if the TPM is good for DRM then it is also
>>good for protecting servers and the data on them,
>
> In which way, and for what sorts of "protection"?  And I mean that as a
> serious inquiry, not just a "Did you spill my pint?" question.  At the moment
> the sole significant use of TPMs is Bitlocker, which uses it as little more
> than a PIN-protected USB memory key and even then functions just as well
> without it.  To take a really simple usage case, how would you:
>
> - Generate a public/private key pair and use it to sign email (PGP, S/MIME,
>  take your pick)?

  I had this working using openCryptoki, the trousers TSS and Mozilla
Thunderbird on openSUSE Linux.  If the setup instructions aren't in
the various readmes of those projects I can help you set it up if
you'd like.

> - As above, but send the public portion of the key to someone and use the
>  private portion to decrypt incoming email?

  A simple PKCS#11 app to extract the public key is all that's needed
with the above tools.

> (for extra points, prove that it's workable by implementing it using an actual
> TPM to send and receive email with it, which given the hit-and-miss

  Done. :-)  Last time I tested this it worked fine...  Circa 2006...

Kent

> functionality and implementation quality of TPMs is more or less a required
> second step).  I've implemented PGP email using a Fortezza card (which is
> surely the very last thing it was ever intended for), but not using a TPM...
>
>>Mark Ryan presented a plausible use case that is not DRM:
>>http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mdr/research/projects/08-tpmFunc/.
>
> This use is like the joke about the dancing bear, the amazing thing isn't the
> quality of the "dancing" but the fact that the bear can "dance" at all :-).
> It's an impressive piece of lateral thinking, but I can't see people rushing
> out to buy TPM-enabled PCs for this.
>
> Peter.
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> The Cryptography Mailing List
> Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com
>

---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com