HSM outage causes root CA key loss

[Dirk-Willem van Gulik]

Weger, B.M.M. de wrote:

> - if they rely on the CA for signing CRLs (or whatever
>    revocation mechanism they're using) then they have to find
>    some other way to revoke existing certificates.
...
> Seems to me that for signing CRLs it's better to have a separate
> "Revocation Authority" (whose certificate should be issued by
> the CA it is revoking for); then revoking can continue when the
> CA loses its private key. The CA still may have revoking
> authority as well, at least to revoke the Revocation Authority's
> certificate...

Unfortunately those code paths seem rarely traveled/tested between 
implementations and even within a single implementations fraught with 
caveats; so one often ends up with a (sub) CA in the same chain as the 
cert one wants to revoke.

 > Any other problems? Maybe something with key rollover or
 > interoperability?

Aye - and there is another area which is even less traveled than above.

Dw

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