OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

[Peter Gutmann]

Eric Rescorla <ekr at networkresonance.com> writes:

>It's easy to compute all the public keys that will be generated
>by the broken PRNG. The clients could embed that list and refuse
>to accept any certificate containing one of them. So, this
>is distinct from CRLs in that it doesn't require knowing 
>which servers have which cert...

You'd also end up with a rather large list for the client to carry around, 
which would be especially problematic for lightweight clients.  You'd need to 
represent it as something like a Bloom filter to avoid this (given that most 
users will just click OK on invalid certs, the small false positive rate 
shouldn't have much effect either :-).

Peter.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com