OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

[Dave Korn]

Eric Rescorla wrote on 08 August 2008 16:06:

> At Fri, 8 Aug 2008 11:50:59 +0100,
> Ben Laurie wrote:
>> However, since the CRLs will almost certainly not be checked, this
>> means the site will still be vulnerable to attack for the lifetime of
>> the certificate (and perhaps beyond, depending on user
>> behaviour). Note that shutting down the site DOES NOT prevent the attack.
>> 
>> Therefore mitigation falls to other parties.
>> 
>> 1. Browsers must check CRLs by default.
> 
> Isn't this a good argument for blacklisting the keys on the client
> side?

  Isn't that exactly what "Browsers must check CRLs" means in this context
anyway?  What alternative client-side blacklisting mechanism do you suggest?

    cheers,
      DaveK
-- 
Can't think of a witty .sigline today....

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