New results against the Mifare cipher
Peter Gutmann
pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz
Thu Apr 17 04:21:28 EDT 2008
http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/166
Algebraic Attacks on the Crypto-1 Stream Cipher in MiFare Classic and Oyster
Cards
Nicolas T. Courtois and Karsten Nohl and Sean O'Neil
MiFare Crypto 1 is a lightweight stream cipher used in London's Oyster card,
Netherland's OV-Chipcard, US Boston's CharlieCard, and in numerous wireless
access control and ticketing systems worldwide. Recently, researchers have
been able to recover this algorithm by reverse engineering.
We have examined MiFare from the point of view of the so called "algebraic
attacks". We can recover the full 48-bit key of MiFare algorithm in 200
seconds on a PC, given 1 known IV (from one single encryption).
The security of this cipher is therefore close to zero. This is particularly
shocking, given the fact that, according to the Dutch press, 1 billion of
MiFare Classic chips are used worldwide, including in many governmental
security systems.
Peter.
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