Seagate announces hardware FDE for laptop and desktop machines

[ji at tla.org]

Ivan Krsti? wrote:
> On Sep 6, 2007, at 6:14 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> 
>> other known good implementations of AES128 (CBC? I'm not
>> sure...).
> 
> Plain AES-CBC is not a great choice for FDE. You can do whatever you'd 
> like to the bits of a given block at the cost of garbling the previous 
> block, which makes binaries a plausible target. Given the size of modern 
> OSes, it might even be an easy one.
> 

That's not the threat model; the main use of FDE is to protect the data 
in a lost/stolen laptop.

FWIW, a couple of days ago I got yet another of those letters where a 
former employer is informing me that they lost my personal data; this 
time it was AT&T telling me that a laptop with employee benefits on it 
got stolen.

/ji

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