refactoring crypto handshakes (SSL in 3 easy steps)

Steven M. Bellovin smb at cs.columbia.edu
Thu Nov 15 17:39:39 EST 2007


On Wed, 14 Nov 2007 13:45:37 -0600
travis+ml-cryptography at subspacefield.org wrote:

 
> I wonder if we here could develop a handshake that was
> cryptographically secure, resistant to CPU DoS now, and would be
> possible to adjust as we get faster at doing crypto operations to
> reduce latency even further.  Basically an easy knob for balancing
> high latency and DoS resistance vs. crypto overhead and low latency.
> It should be adjustable on either end without altering the other.
> 
Depending on your goals, JFK has some of those properties; see
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/jfk-tissec.pdf


		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

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