307 digit number factored

[Victor Duchovni]

On Wed, May 23, 2007 at 02:45:49PM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote:

> Victor Duchovni <Victor.Duchovni at MorganStanley.com> writes:
> 
> >As 1024 RSA keys are not a major risk *today*,
> 
> I would go further and say that for most applications of PKCs/PKI today, 1024-
> bit RSA keys are not a risk at all, or more specifically that on a scale of
> risk they're so far down the list that they're close to negligible.

Indeed, and since the certs I acquire from CAs today expire in a year,
I don't feel at all guilty about generating CSRs with 1024 bit keys.
Clearly, a public CA cert with a lifetime of 10-20 years is another
matter, but otherwise in most cases there is no need to panic.  Not too
many organizations outside the TLAs are using RSA to encrypt multi-decade
secrets...

Software that will be in the field for a long time, should support
stronger keys and if possible alternative algorithms (say ECC), but
short-term authentication keys deployed today, are just fine as they are.

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