Quantum Cryptography

[Ed Gerck]

Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> To me, QKD is indeed a very valid area for research.  It's a very
> different approach; ultimately, it may prove to be useful, at least in
> some circumstances.

As a physicist, with a doctorate in quantum optics, I want to
add my agreement to Steve's comment. And extend his comment to
note that quantum cryptography (QC) is much more than QKD and even
more than the qbit theories used today to represent information
in terms of entangled states.

The model of information in QC will certainly evolve. Today,
the rather naive security assumptions in QC (and QKD based on
QC) might just reflect equally naive security assumptions
found in today's conventional cryptography. [1]

I would suggest QC as a very fruitful area of research, and one
that can add much insight back into conventional cryptography.

Cheers,
Ed Gerck

[1] For example, the rather common idea that risk can be defined
independent of trust or even, that the IT concept of trust is just
some kind of authorization. Yes, it is true that in a closed network
a trusted user can be described as a user that is authorized by Z to
do X within Y, but in an open network there is really no "Z" to
authorize anything. It is not that trust evaporates in an open
network -- naive representations just can't describe it. Or, the
equally embarrassing question of what happens when you connect
two trusted systems. Are they, together, more trusted, less
trusted, or equally trusted? Again, naive representations of trust
just can't answer this. No wonder that QC has problems there as
well.

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