analysis and implementation of LRW

[Peter Gutmann]

David Wagner <daw at cs.berkeley.edu>
>Jim Hughes writes:
>> The IEEE P1619 standard group has dropped LRW mode. It has a vulnerability
>> that that are collisions that will divulge the mixing key which will reduce
>> the mode to ECB.
>
>Peter Gutmann asks:
>> Is there any more information on this anywhere?  I haven't been able to find
>> anything in the P1619 archives (or at least not under an obvious heading).
>
>Alexander Klimov replies:
>>Probably <http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00962.html>
>
>Huh.  Was that the reason?  I suspect there may have been more to it than
>that.  

Actually there's a lot more to it than that, the original analysis was posted
by Quantum crypto guy Matt Ball (that's the drive manufacturer Quantum, not
quantum crypto) in late 2005:

  http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00558.html

with a followup in early 2006:

  http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00588.html

So it's not a case of "google is your friend", it's "'knowing which magic
incantation to type into google to find what you're looking for' is your
friend".

Anyway, it's a pretty detailed analysis, well worth reading.

Peter.

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