It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?

Steve Schear s.schear at
Tue Jan 16 10:56:22 EST 2007

At 06:32 AM 1/16/2007, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>Disk encryption, in general, is useful when the enemy has physical
>access to the disk.  Laptops -- the case you describe on your page --
>do fit that category; I have no quarrel with disk encryption for them.
>It's more dubious for desktops and *much* more dubious for servers.

As governments widen their definitions of just who is a potential threat it 
makes increasing sense for citizens engaged in previous innocuous 
activities (especially political and financial privacy) to protect their 
data from being useful if seized.  This goes double for those operating 
privacy-oriented services and their servers.  As an example, when TOR 
servers were recently seized in German raids (with the implication that 
they were being used as conduits for child porn) the police knew enough to 
only take the hot-swap drives (which were encrypted and therefore paper 
weights after removal) if only for show.  The main loss to the operators 
was repair to the cage locks.


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