OT: SSL certificate chain problems

Mon Feb 5 01:15:45 EST 2007

Hi all,

I am looking for some information related to PKCS #15, especially the 
"HOWTO" of setting up the file structures and security data management (on 
IC Cards or "smart cards"). 
Any relevant pointers towards this please share here, thanks!

Best Regards,

Arun Varghese,
NXP Software, Block C, 4th Floor
MFAR Manyata Tech Park
Nagavara, Bangalore-560045
Tel : +91 80 4026 7000 Extn: 7817
Fax : +91 80 4026 7855
E-mail:arun.varghese at nxp.com, 
www.software.nxp.com

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Victor Duchovni <Victor.Duchovni at MorganStanley.com> 
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2007-02-04 12:45 PM

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Subject
Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems
Classification

On Wed, Jan 31, 2007 at 01:57:04PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:

> Victor Duchovni <Victor.Duchovni at MorganStanley.com> writes:
> 
> >What I don't understand is how the old (finally expired) root helps to
> >validate the new unexpired root, when a verifier has the old root and 
the
> >server presents the new root in its trust chain.
> 
> You use the key in the old root to validate the self-signature in the 
new
> root.  Since they're the same key, you know that the new root supersedes 
the
> expired one.

Does this actually work with OpenSSL and v3 CA certs that have "X509v3
Authority Key Identifier" extensions? With these extensions present
(default when OpenSSL constructs CA certs, ...), certs whose serial number
does not match the "serial" field in the extension are not considered
to be root CA certs (not self-signed), and CA certs sharing the same
keys and DN, but carrying different serials, simply don't match.

If I roll-back the serial numbers and issue a cert with all the details
(including serial number, ...) the same, but just the start/end dates
changed to start before the expiration of the verifier's expired CA,
and end after today's date, the verifier ends up with a trust chain that
starts with the expired cert and fails, regardless of whether the server
sends the new root CA cert or not.

    CA0.pem:
    --------
    serial=C27B874157E381C0
    issuer= <fixed-ca-dn>
    subject= <fixed-ca-dn>
    notBefore=Jan  1 00:00:00 2007 GMT
    notAfter=Jan 31 00:00:00 2007 GMT
    ...
    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
 keyid:CB:C0:45:68:F9:B0:DF:8B:A9:E9:EA:A0:F1:93:A1:C1:6B:7C:96:E4
                 DirName:<fixed-ca-dn>
                 serial:C2:7B:87:41:57:E3:81:C0

    CA1.pem:
    --------
    serial=C27B874157E381C0
    issuer= <fixed-ca-dn>
    subject= <fixed-ca-dn>
    notBefore=Jan 15 00:00:00 2007 GMT
    notAfter=Feb 28 00:00:00 2007 GMT
    ...
    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
 keyid:CB:C0:45:68:F9:B0:DF:8B:A9:E9:EA:A0:F1:93:A1:C1:6B:7C:96:E4
                 DirName:<fixed-ca-dn>
                 serial:C2:7B:87:41:57:E3:81:C0

    SRV.pem:
    ---------
    serial=C27B874157E381C1
    issuer= <fixed-ca-dn>
    subject= <server-dn>
    notBefore=Jan 15 00:00:00 2007 GMT
    notAfter=Feb 28 00:00:00 2007 GMT
    ...
    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
 keyid:CB:C0:45:68:F9:B0:DF:8B:A9:E9:EA:A0:F1:93:A1:C1:6B:7C:96:E4
                 DirName:<fixed-ca-dn>
                 serial:C2:7B:87:41:57:E3:81:C0

A client with CAfile containing just "CA0.pem" fails to verify a server
configured to send the SRV,CA1 trust chain. My verification callback is
called three times and produces:

  Trace: certificate verification depth=1 verify=0 subject=<fixed-ca-dn>
  Error: CA certificate verification failed for <peer> certificate has 
expired

  Trace: certificate verification depth=1 verify=1 subject=<fixed-ca-dn>

  Trace: certificate verification depth=0 verify=1 subject=<server-dn>

If the verifier trusts the "CA1.pem" cert, I see instead:

  Trace: certificate verification depth=1 verify=1 subject=<fixed-ca-dn>

  Trace: certificate verification depth=0 verify=1 
subject=<fixed-server-dn>

How does one construct a working (re-issued root CA) example with OpenSSL?
Am I setting this up incorrectly, or does OpenSSL not in fact support
establishing trust in re-issued root CA via now expired root CAs?

I have not tried to do this without the "issuer key identifier" extension,
but don't really expect to find anything different...

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