Flaws in OpenSSL FIPS Object Module

[Leichter, Jerry]

| What does it say about the integrity of the FIPS program, and its CMTL
| evaluation process, when it is left to competitors to point out
| non-compliance of evaluated products -- proprietary or open source --
| to basic architectural requirements of the standard?
I was going to ask the same question.  My answer:  This proves yet again
how far we are from a servicable ability to produce secure software.

Software that's been through the FIPS process has been vetted to the limits
of our current abilities under the constraints of being even vaguely
commercially viable.  OpenSSL is open source software that's been around
for a long time, examined by many, many people.  It had a very rough
journey through the FIPS process, so was presumably checked even more
than software that just breezes through.  Even so ... it had a security
bug.  It's hard to suggest something that could have been done differently
to guarantee that this couldn't happen.  Anyone who might argue - as I'm
sure they will - that this "proves you should use commercial software
rather than OSS if you need security" is speaking nonsense - that's not
at all what this incident is about.

It is, of course, the height of irony that the bug was introduced in the
very process, and for the very purpose, of attaining FIPS compliance!

							-- Jerry

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