A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem

[James A. Donald]

     --
On 9/15/06, David Shaw <dshaw at jabberwocky.com> wrote:
 >> GPG was not vulnerable, so no fix was issued.
 >> Incidentally, GPG does not attempt to parse the
 >> PKCS/ASN.1 data at all.  Instead, it generates a new
 >> structure during signature verification and compares
 >> it to the original.

Taral wrote:
 > *That* is the Right Way To Do It. If there are
 > variable parts (like hash OID, perhaps), parse them
 > out, then regenerate the signature data and compare it
 > byte-for-byte with the decrypted signature. Anything
 > you don't understand/control that might be variable
 > (e.g. options) is eliminated by this process.
 >
 > I don't think there's anything inherently wrong with
 > ASN.1 DER in crypto applications.

If there are no options, you are not using ASN.1 DER.
You are using some random padding bytes that happen to
be equal to ASN.1 DER.

     --digsig
          James A. Donald
      6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
      mMZpx7gaL6S/5STlYWv0A0ZM+HqCZSD2m0ClWjxL
      4UR16e+x3Uv/VW8C0Swxx9XMPtH99PEBNIc6BzpkQ

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