New ISO standard aims to ensure the security of financial transactions on the Internet

[Anne & Lynn Wheeler]

New ISO standard aims to ensure the security of financial transactions 
on the Internet
http://continuitycentral.com/news02582.htm

from above:

ISO 21188:2006, ‘Public Key Infrastructure for financial services – 
practices and policy framework’, offers a set of guidelines to assist 
risk managers, business managers and analysts, technical designers and 
implementers and operational management and auditors in the financial 
services industry.

... snip ...

my two bits ... in part, in light of recent pin&chip vulnerability thread

another metaphor for viewing the session authentication paradigm is that 
they tend to leave the actual transaction naked and vulnerable.

we had worked on the original payment gateway for what become to be 
called e-commerce
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn2
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn3

which we also assert can be considered the first SOA implementation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006l.html#38 Token-ring vs Ethernet - 10 
years later

to some extent part of the transaction vulnerability analysis for x9.59 
transactions in the mid-90s was based on analysis and experience with 
the original payment gateway implemented with session oriented paradigm.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#x959

work on x9.59 in the mid-90s, did what very few other protocols did, 
defined end-to-end transaction strong authentication. many of the other 
protocols would leave the transaction naked and vulnerable at various 
steps in the processing.

session oriented protocols leaving the actual transaction naked and 
vulnerable (or the actual transaction not having complete end-to-end 
transaction strong authentication and therefor naked and vulnerable for 
at least some part of the processing) ... implies that the complete, 
whole end-to-end business process has to be heavily armored and secured. 
Minor chinks in the business armoring will expose the naked transaction 
to potentional attack and fraud.

if outsider attacks aren't enuf, naked transactions are also extremely 
vulnerable to insider attacks. nominally, transactions will be involved 
in a large number of different business processes ... exposing them to 
insider attacks at every step. end-to-end transaction strong 
authentication armors the actual transaction (avoiding leaving the 
transaction naked and vulnerable at vast array of processing steps). the 
naked transaction paradigm also contributes to the observation that 
something like seventy percent of fraud in such environments involve 
insiders.

end-to-end transaction strong authentication (armoring the actual 
transaction) then also alleviates the need for enormous amounts of total 
business process armoring (where absolutely no chinks in the armor can 
be allowed ... which is necessary for protecting naked and vulnerable 
transactions ... which don't have end-to-end transaction strong 
authentication).

the x9a10 working group (for what become the x9.59 financial standard) 
had been given the requirement to preserve the integrity of the 
financial infrastructure for all retail payments. this met not only 
having countermeasures to things like replay attacks (static data that 
could be easily skimmed), but also having end-to-end transaction strong 
authentication (eliminating the vulnerabilities associated with having 
naked and vulnerable transactions at various points in the infrastructure).

part of the x9.59 financial standard for all retail payments in armoring 
and protecting transactions included the business rule that account 
numbers used in x9.59 transactions could not be used in transactions 
that didn't have end-to-end transaction strong authentication. this
eliminated the problem with knowledge leakage of the account number 
representing a vulnerability (i.e. a naked account number was no longer 
vulnerable for use in fraudulent transactions).

part of the theme of the post on security proportional to risk is that 
if the individual transactions aren't armored then it can be 
extraordinarily expensive to provide absolutely perfect infrastructure 
armoring to protect naked and vulnerable transactions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#61

part of the issue with some of the payment oriented protocols in the 
mid-90s looking at providing end-to-end strong authentication based on 
digital signature paradigm was the mistaken belief regarding appending 
digital certificates as part of the implementation. typical payment 
transaction is on the order of 60-80 bytes. the various payment 
protocols from the period with appended digital certificates had a 
payload bloat of 4k to 12k bytes (or a payload bloat of one hundred 
times). it was difficult to justify an enormous end-to-end payload bloat 
of one hundred times for a redundant and superfluous digital 
certificate, so the protocols tended to strip the digital certificate 
off, leaving the transaction naked and vulnerable during subsequent 
processing. of course this was before I had demonstrated that it was 
possible to compress appended digital certificates to zero bytes 
(opening the way for x9.59 transactions with end-to-end strong 
authentication based on digital signatures).

rather than viewing x9.59 as using certificateless digital signatures 
for end-to-end transaction strong authentication
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#certless
just consider that x9.59 has appended compressed zero byte digital 
certificates to address the severe payload bloat problem

the issue of SDA (static data authentication vulnerable to replay 
attacks) or DDA (countermeasure to replay attacks) is somewhat 
independent of using a session oriented implementation (and having naked 
and vulnerable transactions at various points in the infrastructure):
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm23.htm#55 UK Detects Chip-And-PIN 
Security Flaw
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm23.htm#56 UK Detects Chip-And-PIN 
Security Flaw
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#0 FraudWatch - Chip&Pin, a new 
tenner (USD10)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#1 UK Detects Chip-And-PIN 
Security Flaw
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#2 UK Banks Expected To Move To 
DDA EMV Cards
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#3 FraudWatch - Chip&Pin, a new 
tenner (USD10)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006l.html#27 Google Architecture
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006l.html#32 Google Architecture
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006l.html#33 Google Architecture
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006l.html#37 Google Architecture

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