Status of SRP

[Anne & Lynn Wheeler]

Florian Weimer wrote:
> If you've deployed two-factor authentication (like German banks did in
> the late 80s/early 90s), the relevant attacks do involve compromised
> customer PCs. 8-( Just because you can't solve it with your technology
> doesn't mean you can pretend the attacks don't happen.

EU finread terminal was countermeasure to (widely held impression that) 
PCs are extremely vulnerable to compromise.

card authentication required pin entry to work ... and finread terminal 
had its own PIN-pad distinct the vulnerable PC keyboard. orientation was 
towards transaction authentication ... with the finread terminal also 
having its own display of what was being authentication. the transaction 
authentication orientation was countermeasure to session authentication 
orientation where PC compromises could operate within the boundaries of 
any authenticated session.

part of thread in sci.crypt mentioning finread terminal as 
countermeasure to (widely held view of) the ease of PC compromises
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006k.html#46 Keylogger resistance
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006k.html#52 Keylogger resistance

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