Factorization polynomially reducible to discrete log - known

[Peter Kosinar]

>> Not exactly. Consider N = 3*7 = 21, phi(N) = 12, g = 4, x = 2, x' = 5.
>> You'll only get a multiple of phi(N) if g was a generator of the
>> multiplicative group Z_N^*.
>
> When N is a large RSA modulus, there is a non-trivial probability that g
> will be a generator (or that g will be such that x-x' lets you factor N).
> The above is good enough for a polytime reduction.

You're absolutely right, although the probability actually does not depend 
on the size of the modulus (in fact, the provable lower bound on this 
probability goes down with size of the modulus), as it depends only on the 
factorization of phi(N) which, in turn, might depend on the process used 
to choose the factors of the modulus (e.g. sometimes-suggested approach of 
using Sophie-Germain primes creates abundance of generators; whereas some 
primorial-like construction might decrease it).

Peter

-- 
[Name] Peter Kosinar   [Quote] 2B | ~2B = exp(i*PI)   [ICQ] 134813278


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