thoughts on one time pads

[Anne & Lynn Wheeler]

John Denker wrote:
> I forgot to mention in my previous message:
> 
> It is worth your time to read _Between Silk and Cyanide_.
> That contains an example of somebody who thought really
> hard about what his threat was, and came up with a system
> to deal with the threat ... a system that ran counter to
> the previous conventional wisdom.  It involved protecting
> keys before use and destroying them after use.

an open question is whether preventing anybody from accessing the cd
for skimming is also sufficient for preventing anybody from accessing
the cd for theft. this has some analogy to tamper-evident vis-a-vis
tamper-proof. obviously theft leaves more tell tail trails (aka
tamper-evident). then does any countermeasures for skimming
(tamper-proof) have to be more stringent than countermeausures for
theft (tamper-evident). destroying the used keys is countermeausre for
all kinds of access of the used keys. however destroying used keys still
leaves vulnerability of skimming the unused keys (on the same cd). if
the countermeasures for skimming the unused keys (tamper-proof) is
sufficiently high ... then that may also be adequate for all kinds of
access to the used keys on the same cd.

but as mentioned ... there are also the people of the school of thot
that more security is always better.

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