long-term GPG signing key

[Perry E. Metzger]

Ian G <iang at systemics.com> writes:
> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>> Ian G <iang at systemics.com> writes:
>>
>>>Travis H. wrote:
>>>
>>>>I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using
>>>>GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such.  I
>>>>remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the
>>>>impression that the 1024 bit strength provided by p in the DSA is not
>>>>sufficiently strong when compared to my encryption keys, which are
>>>>typically at least 4096-bit D/H, which I typically use for a year.
>>>
>>>1. Signing keys face a different set of
>>>non-crypto threats than to encryption
>>>keys.  In practice, the attack envelope
>>>is much smaller, less likely.
>> I call "bull".
>> You have no idea what his usage pattern is like, and you have no idea
>> what the consequences for him of a forged signature key might be. It
>> is therefore unreasonable -- indeed, unprofessional -- to make such
>> claims off the cuff.
>
> You seem to have missed the next sentance:

No, I didn't.

>     ".... Unless you have
>     particular circumstances, it's not
>     as important to have massive strength in
>     signing keys as it is in encryption keys."

Even in totally ordinary circumstances it is important to have very
strong signing keys. Your comments were insupportable.

Perry

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