NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use

John W Noerenberg II jwn2 at qualcomm.com
Fri Feb 24 18:15:04 EST 2006


While there is merit in arguing how to simplify the mechanics of 
using public key encryption for sending and receiving email, I cannot 
agree with this assertion:

At 10:44 AM -0800 2/24/06, Ed Gerck wrote:
>
>My $0.02: If we want to make email encryption viable (ie, user-level viable)
>then we should make sure that people who want to read a secure communication
>should NOT have to do anything before receiving it. Having to publish my key
>creates sender's hassle too ...to find the key.

If an individual wants to receive telephone calls, he has to agree to 
publish his phone number.  For many years, we tacitly agreed that our 
phone numbers would be published.  That a phone number was public 
information wasn't perceived as a problem.  But as the number of junk 
calls increases, the number of people who opt out of phone 
directories increases.  Today, more individuals decide that having a 
public phone number is a problem.

In this regard, public keys are just like cell phone numbers.  How 
many people know your cell phone number?  How did they get it?  You 
can't get a cell phone number from directory assistance.  So if you 
want someone to be able to call you on your cell phone, you have to 
give them the "key" to your cell phone.  If you want someone to send 
you encrypted email, you have to give them your public key.   It's 
the same thing.

Yet cell phones seem to be viable.

-- 

john noerenberg
   ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    It took long enough in all conscience for realization to come that
    the externals of civilization - technology, industry, commerce, and
    so on - also require a common basis of intellectual honesty and morality.
   -- Herman Hesse, The Glass Bead Game, 1943
   ----------------------------------------------------------------------

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