NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use

Ed Gerck edgerck at nma.com
Fri Feb 24 10:50:34 EST 2006


Ben Laurie wrote:
> Ed Gerck wrote:
>> This IS one of the sticky points ;-) If postal mail would work this way,
>> you'd have to ask me to send you an envelope before you can send me mail.
>> This is counter-intuitive to users.
> 
> We have keyservers for this (my chosen technology was PGP). If you liken
> their use to looking up an address in an address book, this isn't hard
> for users to grasp.

Well, the observation (as I hear the NPR piece) is that it HAS been hard
to grasp.

Further, the comparison with "looking up an address in an address book" is
also not even close to the level of hassle that users need to go through with
PGP (and PKI). Please google "Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation
of PGP 5.0" and comments in the Usability section of
<http://email-security.net/papers/pki-pgp-ibe.htm/>

> 
>> Your next questions could well be how do you know my key is really mine...
>> how do you know it was not revoked ...all of which are additional sticky
>> points.
> 
> For revocation, keyservers again. 

Last time I looked, a lot of PGP keys in keyservers are useless because users
(most often) simply forgot their passphrase...

> If I cared whether it was really yours
> (I don't), then I'd check the signatures, or verify the fingerprint
> out-of-band.

Out-of-band is good. But, again, the hassle factor...

>> In the postal mail world, how'd you know the envelope is really from me or
>> that it is secure?
> 
> I don't.

Yes, but since you don't need to ask for one... no problem. You just use your
own envelope to send postal mail to me. The PKI problem is that it runs backwards
to normal mail flow -- you need to ask me for my envelope before you can send me a
secure message. IBE doesn't have this problem, even though it has key escrow.

Cheers,
Ed Gerck

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