[smb at cs.columbia.edu: Skype security evaluation]

[Whyte, William]

A similar approach enabled Bleichenbacher's SSL attack on 
RSA with PKCS#1 padding. This sounds very dangerous to me.

William 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com 
> [mailto:owner-cryptography at metzdowd.com] On Behalf Of cyphrpunk
> Sent: Friday, October 28, 2005 5:07 AM
> To: cypherpunks at jfet.org; cryptography at metzdowd.com
> Subject: Re: [smb at cs.columbia.edu: Skype security evaluation]
> 
> Wasn't there a rumor last year that Skype didn't do any encryption
> padding, it just did a straight exponentiation of the plaintext?
> 
> Would that be safe, if as the report suggests, the data being
> encrypted is 128 random bits (and assuming the encryption exponent is
> considerably bigger than 3)? Seems like it's probably OK. A bit risky
> perhaps to ride bareback like that but I don't see anything inherently
> fatal.
> 
> CP
> 
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