[Clips] Read two biometrics, get worse results - how it works

[R.A. Hettinga]

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 <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/19/daugman_multi_biometrics/print.html>

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 Original URL:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/19/daugman_multi_biometrics/
 Read two biometrics, get worse results - how it works
 By John Lettice (john.lettice at theregister.co.uk)
 Published Wednesday 19th October 2005 14:47 GMT

 A regular correspondent (thanks, you know who you are) points us to some
 calculations by John Daugman, originator of the Daugman algorithms for iris
 recognition. These ought to provide disturbing reading for Home Office
 Ministers who casually claim that by using multiple biometrics
 (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/17/mcnulty_fingers_id_problem/)
 you'll get a better result than by using just the one. Although that may
 seem logical, it turns out that it it isn't, necessarily.

 Daugman presents
 (http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/jgd1000/combine/combine.html) the two rival
 intuitions, then does the maths. On the one hand, a combination of
 different tests should improve performance, because more information is
 better than less information. But on the other, the combination of a strong
 test with a weak test to an extent averages the result, so the result
 should be less reliable than if one were relying solely on the strong test.
 (If Tony McNulty happens to be with us, we suggest he fetches the ice pack
 now.)

 "The key to resolving the apparent paradox," writes Daugman, "is that when
 two tests are combined, one of the resulting error rates (False Accept or
 False Reject rate) becomes better than that of the stronger of the two
 tests, while the other error rate becomes worse even than that of the
 weaker of the tests. If the two biometric tests differ significantly in
 their power, and each operates at its own cross-over point, then combining
 them gives significantly worse performance than relying solely on the
 stronger biometric.

 This is of particular relevance to the Home Office's current case for use
 of multiple biometrics, because its argument is based on the use of three
 types of biometric, fingerprint, facial and iris, which are substantially
 different in power.

 Daugman produces the calculations governing the use of two hypothetical
 biometrics, one with both false accept and false reject rates of one in
 100, and the second with the two rates at one in 1,000. On its own,
 biometric one would produce 2,000 errors in 100,000 tests, while biometric
 two would produce 200. You can treat the use of two biometrics in one of
 two ways - the subject must be required to pass both (the 'AND' rule) or
 the subject need only pass one (the 'OR' rule). Daugman finds that under
 either rule there would be 1,100 errors, i.e. 5.5 times more errors than if
 the stronger test were used alone.

 He concludes that a stronger biometric is therefore better used alone than
 in combination, but only when both are operating at their crossover points.
 If the false accept rate (when using the 'OR' rule) or the false reject
 rate (when using the 'AND' rule) is brought down sufficiently (to "smaller
 than twice the crossover error rate of the stronger test", says Daugman)
 then use of two can improve results. If we recklessly attempt to put a
 non-mathemetical gloss on that, we could think of the subject having to
 pass two tests (in the case of the 'AND') rule of, say, facial and iris.
 Dropping the false reject rate of the facial test (i.e. letting more people
 through) in line with Daugman's calculations would produce a better result
 than using iris alone, but if the facial system rejects fewer people
 wrongly, then it will presumably be accepting more people wrongly.

 Which suggests to us that simply regarding a second or third biometric as a
 fall back to be used only if earlier tests fail constructs a scenario where
 the combined results will be worse than use of the single stronger test,
 because in such cases the primary biometric test would have to be
 sufficiently strong to stand on its own, because you won't always be using
 the second or third test.

 The deployment of biometric testing equipment in the field is also likely
 to have a confusing effect on relative error rates, because environmental
 factors will tend to impact the different tests to different degrees. Poor
 lighting may have an effect on iris and facial but not on fingerprint,
 while the aircon breaking down may produce greasy fingers and puffy red
 faces, but leave iris intact. Which would presumably mess up attempts to
 sync error rates.

 But we feel ourselves beginning to intuit, and had perhaps best back off
 before phalanxes of irate mathematicians come after us. On the upside for
 the Home Office, Daugman points out that the combination of two tests of
 equal power - the iris patterns of both eyes, or two of a person's
 fingerprints - can enhance performance fairly easily. This actually
 provides some justification for the Home Office starting to count eyes and
 fingers individually, although the way they're putting it still sounds like
 the techies told them something, and now they're trying to repeat it
 without really understanding.

 The extent to which they really do count the biometrics separately will
 also be important. Daugman points out that his calculations only deal deal
 with "decision-level fusion" (i.e. applying the decision rules to the
 individual biometrics separately), but there are other approaches such as
 sensor fusion, where the data is combined before decision rules are
 applied, or combining similarity scores before applying decision rules. As
 far as fingerprint is concerned, the Home Office certainly intends to have
 all ten prints on file, but there are all sorts of different ways that a
 test could read the data. Is a 'handslap' reading five individual
 biometrics read at once, or just the one? It depends how you treat it and
 how you use the decision rules on the data, and how you do this will have
 an effect on the validity of your claims about multiple biometrics.
 --
 -----------------
 R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
 The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
 "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
 [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
 experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
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-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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