"ISAKMP" flaws?

Florian Weimer fw at deneb.enyo.de
Fri Nov 18 16:43:23 EST 2005


* William Allen Simpson:

> Florian Weimer wrote:
>> Photuris uses a baroque variable-length integer encoding similar to
>> that of OpenPGP, a clear warning sign. 8-/ 
>
> On the contrary:
>
>  + a VERY SIMPLE "variable-length integer encoding", where every number
>    has EXACTLY ONE possible representation (unlike ASN.1 which even the
>    spell-checker wants to replace with assinine).
>
>  + "similar to that of OpenPGP", the most common Open Source security
>    software of the era, where the code could be easily reused (as it
>    was in the initial implementation).

Even back then, the integer encoding was considered to be a mistake.

| I concur completely. I once got so fed up with this habit that I
| tromped around the office singing, "Every bit is sacred / Every bit
| is great / When a bit is wasted / Phil gets quite irate."
| 
| Consider this to be one of the prime things to correct. Personally,
| I think that numbers should never (well, hardly ever) be smaller
| than 32 bits.

(Jon Callas, 1997-08-08)

>> The protocol also contains
>> nested containers which may specify conflicting lengths.  This is one
>> common source of parser bugs.
>> 
> On the contrary, where are internal nested containers in the protocol?

Variable-length integers within other fields, for example.  You can't
avoid this phenomenon in its entirety, of course, without sacrificing
some of the advantages of a binary encoding.

> Again, the ISAKMP flaws were foreseeable and avoidable.  And Photuris
> was written before the existence of ISAKMP.

I like ISAKMP as much as the next guy, but somehow I doubt that
simpler protocols necessarily lead to more robust software.  Sure,
less effort is needed to implement them, but writing robust code still
comes at an extra cost. *sigh*

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