AES cache timing attack

[Bill Stewart]

At 02:44 AM 6/20/2005, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>Stephan Neuhaus <neuhaus at st.cs.uni-sb.de> writes:
> >Concerning the practical use of AES, you may be right (even though it would
> >be nice to have some advice on what one *should* do instead).

Would switching to triple-AES (or double-AES) or something help?
Yeah, it's ugly, and AES was supposed to let us get away from triple-DES,
but maybe running one AES with the original key and
the other session with the inverse of the key would
interfere with timing attacks?





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