massive data theft at MasterCard processor

Anne & Lynn Wheeler lynn at garlic.com
Wed Jun 22 10:39:02 EDT 2005


Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> so one of the AADS chip strawman suggestions for x9.59 from the 90s
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#aads
> 
> was the same protocol and transaction whether it was with the merchant
> terminals ... or with a consumer owned pda/cellphone device (any kind of
> wireless to the merchant device) ... where a paranoid consumer would
> always maintain physical control of their private display and keypad.

note that "dual-use" attack is another variation on "what you see is not
necessarily what you get".

the dual-use attack ... is possibly a person-centric digitally signing
token (in contrast to institutional-centric token where each institution
might issue a unique token for every use) ... that can be registered for
use in multiple places and applications.

one of the digial signing scenarios is pure authentication where the
server sends out some random data which the end-user signs (effectively
a variation on challenge/response as countermeasure against replay attacks).

the issue in the "dual-use" attack ... is can somebody substitute a
perfectly valid financial transaction in lieu of random challenge data?
this attack is similar but different to point-of-sale attack where the
terminal displays a transaction different than what is provided for
signing ("what you sign is not necessarily what you think you are signing").

"dual-use attack" is against a possibly person-centric digital signing
where the same token/key is used for both authentication events as well
as "signature" type events .... where the signature implies read,
understood, approve, authorize, and/or agree.

misc. past refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#57 dual-use digital signature
vulnerability
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#59 dual-use digital signature
vulnerability
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm18.htm#1 dual-use digital signature
vulnerability
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm18.htm#2 dual-use digital signature
vulnerability
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm18.htm#3 dual-use digital signature
vulnerability
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm18.htm#56 two-factor authentication
problems
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004i.html#17 New Method for Authenticated
Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004i.html#21 New Method for Authenticated
Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2005.html#14 Using smart cards for signing
and authorization in applets
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2005b.html#56 [Lit.] Buffer overruns
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2005e.html#31 Public/Private key pair
protection on Windows
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2005g.html#46 Maximum RAM and ROM for smartcards

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