Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs

[Peter Gutmann]

Erwann ABALEA <erwann at abalea.com> writes:

>I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in installing a
>cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards? I work for a PKI 'vendor',
>and for me, software private keys is a nonsense. 

A simple crypto device controlled by the same software is only slightly less
nonsensical.  That is, the difference between software-controlled keys and a
device controlling the keys that does anything the software tells it to is
negligible.  To get any real security you need to add a trusted display, I/O
system, clock, and complete crypto message-processing capability (not just
"generate a signature" like the current generation of smart cards do), and
that's a long way removed from what TCPA gives you.

>You could obviously say that Mr Smith won't be able to move his certificates
>from machine A to machine B, but more than 98% of the time, Mr Smith doesn't
>need to do that.

Yes he will.  That is, he may not really need to do it, but he really, really
wants to do it.  Look at the almost-universal use of PKCS #12 to allow people
to spread their keys around all over the place - any product aimed at a mass-
market audience that prevents key moving is pretty much dead in the water.

>Installing a TCPA chip is not a bad idea. 

The only effective thing a TCPA chip gives you is a built-in dongle on every
PC.  Whether having a ready-made dongle hardwired into every PC is a good or
bad thing depends on the user (that is, the software vendor using the TCPA
device, not the PC user).

Peter.

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