X.509 / PKI, PGP, and IBE Secure Email Technologies

[Ed Gerck]

Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> usually when you are doing baseline ... you start with the simplest,
> evaluate that and then incrementally add complexity. 

I think that's where PKI got it wrong in several parts and not
just the CPS. It started with the simplest (because it was meant to
work for a global RA -- remember X.500?) and then complexity was
added. Today, in the most recent PKIX dialogues, even RFC authors
often disagree on what is meant in the RFCs. Not to mention the
readers.

As another example, at least one IBE offer does not talk about
key lifetime at all -- in fact, the documentation online talks
about using the same key for _all_ future communications. When this,
of course, fails and key expiration is introduced, it will be
over an existing baseline... a patch. Key revocation will be
even harder to introduce in IBE.

As new capabilities conflict with the old, the end result of this
approach seems to ne a lot of patched in complexity and vulnerabilities.

It seems better to start with a performance specification for the full
system. The code can follow the specs as close as possible for
each version, the specs can change too, but at least the grand
picture should exist beforehand. This is what this thread's subject
paper is about, the grand picture for secure email and why aren't
we there yet (Phil's PGP is almost 15 years old) -- what's missing.

BTW, there's a new version out for the "X.509 / PKI, PGP, and IBE
Secure Email Technologies" paper and Blog comments in the site as well,
at http://email-security.net

Cheers,
Ed Gerck

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