Yahoo releases internet standard draft for using DNS as public key server

Russell Nelson nelson at
Mon May 31 15:14:09 EDT 2004

I see that you are not interested in discussing the relative merits of
STARTTLS vs. DomainKeys, but instead are just trying to push
STARTTLS.  I hope that Perry will see through your sales job, and will
return your email to you, just as he will return this one to me.

[Moderator's note: No such luck for you I'm afraid. However, I'd
prefer if both of you tried to stay away from being personal. --Perry]

Peter Gutmann writes:
 > Russell Nelson <nelson at> writes:
 > >Peter Gutmann writes:
 > >
 > >If Alice and Cathy both implement STARTTLS, and Beatty does not, and Beatty
 > >handles email which is ultimately sent to Cathy, then STARTTLS accomplishes
 > >nothing.  If Uma and Wendy implement DomainKeys, and Violet does not, and
 > >Violet handles email which is ultimately sent to Wendy, then Wendy can check
 > >Uma's signature.
 > Since none of Uma, Wendy, or Violet implement DomainKeys or even know what
 > they are, DomainKeys accomplishes nothing.  OTOH if their { ISP, company,
 > whatever } has STARTTLS enabled, they're getting their email encrypted without
 > even knowing about it and are having better-than-average security applied to
 > their POP/IMAP mail account, again without even knowing about it (I suspect
 > the latter is far more of a selling point to users than encryption.  No-one
 > would want to read their mail anyway so they're not worried about that, but if
 > it stops those nasty hackers from breaking into their account, it's a good
 > thing).
 > >If, instead, Perry had a list of PGP keys and email addresses, he wouldn't
 > >*need* to compare the email address on the incoming email.
 > He'd instead need to spend even more time mucking around with keyrings and
 > updating keys and writing scripts to handle all the checking and wondering why
 > it all has to be so complicated, and maybe he should just ask people to fax in
 > submissions.
 > Peter.

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