The future of security
pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz
Fri May 28 11:27:26 EDT 2004
"Anton Stiglic" <astiglic at okiok.com> writes:
>I think cryptography techniques can provide a partial solution to spam.
No they won't. All the ones I've seen are some variant on the "build a big
wall around the Internet and only let the good guys in", which will never work
because the Internet doesn't contain any definable inside and outside, only
800 million Manchurian candidates waiting to activate. For example
MessageLabs recently reported that *two thirds* of all the spam it blocks is
from infected PCs, with much of it coming from ADSL/cable modem IP pools.
Given that these "spammers" are legitimate users, no amount of crypto will
solve the problem. I did a talk on this recently where I claimed that various
protocols designed to enforce this (Designated Mailers Protocol, Reverse Mail
Exchanger, Sender Permitted From, etc etc) will buy at most 6-12 months, and
the only dissent was from an anti-virus researcher who said it'd buy weeks and
not months. The alternative proof-of-resource-consumption is little better,
since it's not the spammers' resources that are being consumed.
There is one technological solution which would help things a bit, which is
Microsoft implementing virus throttling in the Windows TCP stack. Like a
firebreak, you can never prevent fires, but you can at least limit the damage
when they do occur. Unfortunately I don't see this happening too soon, both
because MS aren't exactly at the forefront of implementing security features
(it took them how many years to add the most basic popup-blocking?), and
because of liability issues - adding virus throttling would be an admission
that Windows is a petri dish.
The problem we're facing is social, not technological, so no there's no
technological fix. The problem is that neither users nor vendors have any
natural incentive to fix things. In the long run, only legislation will help:
penalise vendors for selling spam-enabling software (MS Outlook, via
viruses/worms), and penalise users for running software in a spam-enabling
manner (open relays). This is equivalent to standard corporate-governance
legislation that sets auditing/environmental/due diligence/etc requirements.
Unfortunately this is unlikely to pass in the US (where it matters most) due
to software industry lobbying, it'd require an Enron-style debacle to pass
over there, perhaps a virus-induced reactor meltdown or something similar.
(Much of the above was lifted from "Why isn't the Internet secure yet,
dammit?", http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/dammit.pdf, with the
section on spam starting at page 5. Apologies for the PDF link, but there
are some diagrams in there that don't translate well to text).
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