should you trust CAs? (Re: dual-use digital signature vulnerability)

Aram Perez aramperez at mac.com
Thu Jul 29 01:00:01 EDT 2004


Hi Adam,

> The difference is if the CA does not generate private keys, there
> should be only one certificate per email address, so if two are
> discovered in the wild the user has a transferable proof that the CA
> is up-to-no-good.  Ie the difference is it is detectable and provable.

As far as I know, there is nothing in any standard or "good security
practice" that says you can't multiple certificate for the same email
address. If I'm willing to pay each time, Verisign will gladly issue me a
certificate with my email, I can revoke it, and then pay for another
certificate with the same email. I can repeat this until I'm bankrupt and
Verisign will gladly accept my money.

I agree with Michael H. If you trust the CA to issue a cert, it's not that
much more to trust them with generating the key pair.

Respectfully,
Aram Perez

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