[Publicity-list] DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design
Linda Casals
lindac at dimacs.rutgers.edu
Tue Aug 31 09:54:24 EDT 2004
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DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Auction Design
October 7 - 8, 2004
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers:
Jayant Kalagnanam, IBM Watson Lab, jayant at us.ibm.com
Eric Maskin, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced
Study, maskin at ias.edu
David Parkes, Harvard University, parkes at eecs.harvard.edu
Aleksandar Pekec, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University,
pekec at duke.edu
Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University, rothkopf at rutcor.rutgers.edu
Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and
the Socio-Economic Sciences.
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Recent advances in information technology and its rapid acceptance by
the business community have allowed for the possibility of expediting
complex business transactions. The most prominent example is use of
auctions in corporate procurement and in government deregulation
efforts. When many items with interrelated values are being sold,
economic efficiency can be increased by allowing bidders to make bids
on combinations of items. Procedures for auctioning combinations of
items have inherent computational problems that have to be overcome,
and the emergence of these issues has sparked considerable research
activity in the computer science and combinatorial optimization
communities. The most prominent example is combinatorial auctions in
which multiple goods are auctioned and bidders have and wish to
express different valuations on which goods complement each other and
which goods substitute for each other.
Topics of interest include:
-- expressive bidding languages
-- practical applications (e.g. to electricity, spectrum,...)
-- procurement and e-sourcing
-- combinatorial exchanges
-- preference elicitation
-- optimal auction design
-- approximate mechanisms
-- communication and computation complexity in combinatorial auctions
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Workshop Program:
Thursday, October 7, 2004
8:00 - 8:30 Registration and Breakfast - CoRE Building, 4th Floor
8:30 - 8:45 Welcome and Opening Remarks
Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director
8:45 - 9:30 Characterizing Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multi-dimensional types
Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern
9:30 - 10:10 Multiitem auctions with credit limits
Shmeul Oren and Shehzad Wadawala, UC Berkeley
10:10 - 10:30 Break
10:30 - 11:15 Approximation Algorithms for Truthful Mechanisms
Eva Tardos, Cornell
11:15 - 11:55 Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity
generalized congestion games
Lisa Fleischer, Carnegie Mellon University, Kamal Jain, MSR and
Mohammad Mahdian, MIT
11:55 - 12:35 VCG Overpayment in Random Graphs
Evdokia Nikolova and David Karger, MIT
12:35 - 2:00 Lunch
2:00 - 2:45 The communication requirements of social
choice rules and supporting budget sets
Ilya Segal, Stanford University
2:45 - 3:25 The communication complexity of the private
value single item bisection auction
Elena Grigorieva, P Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Muller, and
Dries Vermeulen, U. Maastricht
3:25 - 3:45 Break
3:45 - 4:30 Market Mechanisms for Redeveloping Spectrum
Evan Kwerel, FCC
4:30 - 5:15 Issues in Electricity Market Auction Design
Richard O'Neill, FERC
5:15 - 6:15 Panel
6:30 Dinner
Friday, October 8, 2004
8:00 - 8:30 Breakfast and Registration
8:30 - 9:15 Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions
Sushil Bikhchandani, UCLA
9:15 - 10:00 The Over-Concentrating Nature of Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Charles Zheng, Northwestern
10:00 - 10:20 Break
10:20 - 11:00 Designing Auction Protocols under Asymmetric Information on
Nature's Selection
Takayuki Ito, Nagoya Inst., Makoto Yokoo, Kyushu and
Shigeo Matsubara, NTT
11:00 - 11:40 Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation
with Value queries in Combinatorial Auctions
Paolo Santi, Pisa, Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University and
Vincent Conitzer, CMU
11:40 - 12:20 Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
in combinatorial auctions
Sebastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes, Harvard
12:20 - 1:30 Lunch
1:30 - 2:15 To auction or not? Historical perspectives on the development
of ecommerce
Andrew Odlyzko, University of Minnesota
2:15 - 2:55 Non-computational Approaches to Mitigating Computational Problems
in Combinatorial Auctions
Sasa Pekec, Duke University and Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University
2:55 - 3:15 Break
3:15 - 3:55 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design
Peter Cramton and Lawrence M.Ausubel, University of Maryland and
Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
3:55 - 4:35 Generation and Selection of Core Outcomes in Sealed Bid
Combinatorial Auctions
Bob Day and S Raghavan, University of Maryland
4:35 - 5:15 Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences
in (Combinatorial) Auctions
Craig Boutilier, University of Toronto, Tuomas
Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University
and Rob Shields, CombineNet
Poster Presentations:
Methods for boosting revenue in Combinatorial Auctions
Anton Likhodedov and Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University
Arbitrage in Combinatorial Exchanges
Andrew Gilpin and Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University
Optimal Auctions with Finite Support
Edith Elkind, Princeton University
Optimal Distributed Protocols for Generalized Job Shop Scheduling
Problems via Ascending Combinatorial Auctions
Judy Geng and Roy Kwon, University of Toronto
Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Coalition-Resistant Markets
Rica Gonen, Hebrew University
Price roll-back in auction algorithms: An exact solution of the
market equilibrium problem
Rahul Garg, IBM India and Sanjiv Kapoor, Illinois Inst.
A Bidder Aid Tool for Dynamic Package Creation in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Karla Hoffman, GMU, Dinesh Menon and Susara A. van den Heever, Decision Analytics
An Exact Algorithm for Procurement Problems under a Total Quantity
Discount Structure
D.Goossens, A.Maas, F.C.R. Spieksma, and J.J van de Klundert,
Maastricht U. and Katholieke U. Leuven
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Registration Fees:
(Pre-registration deadline: September 30, 2004)
Please see website for additional registration information.
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Information on participation, registration, accomodations, and travel
can be found at:
http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/AuctionDesign/
**PLEASE BE SURE TO PRE-REGISTER EARLY**
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