quantum hype

martin f krafft madduck at madduck.net
Fri Sep 19 09:16:27 EDT 2003


also sprach Jill.Ramonsky at Aculab.com <Jill.Ramonsky at Aculab.com> [2003.09.19.1115 +0200]:
> The sender sends RANDOM BITS to the receiver. Those that don't get
> eavesdropped can then be concatenated at both ends to produce an
> identical string of random bits. Since this is known to both
> endpoint parties, and not to the eavesdropper, it can be used as
> a session key for symmetric encryption. So it is not true that you
> have "lost data" by being eavesdropped. You've only lost random
> bits, not real data.

Does reading a quantum bit destroy the bit or simply flip it? If the
latter, how then can you find out when a bit got read?

> No physical theory is _EVER_ "proven", only "corroborated by
> observational evidence". Quantum theory is consistently
> corroborated by observational evidence. For comparison, Newton's
> theory of gravity was never "proven", but it matched (almost) all
> observational evidence.

But Newton gets more wrong the faster you go. So it's not F = m.a,
that theory was only a good approximation, nothing more.

> We _can_ make this statement about Heisenberg's uncertainty
> principle.

Sure we can. But I don't accept an argument that QC is bettern than
asymmetric crypto because the second is based on assumption, when
the first is just as well based on assumption.

Fact is, MagiQ is wrong in claiming theoretical security.

-- 
martin;              (greetings from the heart of the sun.)
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