Digital cash and campaign finance reform

Steve Schear s.schear at comcast.net
Mon Sep 8 13:11:56 EDT 2003


Everyone knows that money is the life blood of politics.  The topic of 
campaign finance reform in the U.S. has been on and off the front burner of 
the major media, for decades.  Although the ability of citizens and 
corporations to support the candidates and parties of their choice can be a 
positive political force, the ability of political contributors to buy 
access and influence legislation is probably the major source of 
governmental corruption.  Despite some, apparently, honest efforts at 
limiting these legal payoffs there has been little real progress.  The 
challenge is to encourage "neutral" campaign contributions.  Perhaps 
technology could lend a hand.

One of the features of Chaimian digital cash is unlinkability.  Normally, 
this has been viewed from the perspective of the payer and payee not 
wishing to be linked to a transaction.  But it also follows that that the 
payee can be prevented from learning the identity of the payee even if they 
wished.  Since the final payee in politics is either the candidate or the 
party, this lack of knowledge could make it much more difficult for the 
money to be involved in influence peddling and quid pro quo back room deals.

By combining a mandated digital cash system for contributions, a cap on the 
size of each individual contribution (perhaps as small as $100), randomized 
delays (perhaps up to a few weeks) in the "posting" of each transaction to 
the account of the counter party, it could create mix conditions which 
would thwart the ability of contributors to easily convince candidates and 
parties that they were the source of particular funds and therefore 
entitled to special treatment.

Comments?

steve


A foolish Constitutional inconsistency is the hobgoblin of freedom, adored 
by judges and demagogue statesmen.
- Steve Schear 


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