Wildcard Certs

[Pete Chown]

martin f krafft wrote:

> This strikes me as notoriously bad, although it is in accordance
> with the RFC. I still don't want to accept the usefulness and
> inherent security, so I'd like to get some expert opinions on this.
> 
> Are wildcard certficates good? secure? useful?

I think this is one of the cases where security can't be considered in 
isolation.  It depends what risks you are trying to protect against.  In 
a large company you might want to limit the effects of a key compromise. 
  For example you might want to make sure that someone who steals the UK 
key can't masquerade as the American office.

I can't see any generalised threats that would justify withdrawing 
wildcard certs, but perhaps others can.

-- 
Pete


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