Fwd: [IP] A Simpler, More Personal Key to Protect OnlineMessages

[Ian Grigg]

Tim Dierks wrote:
...
> the fact that the private key, is, in essence, escrowed by the trusted
> third party, causes me to believe that this system doesn't fill an
> important unmet need.

I'm not sure that's the case!

There are some markets out there where there are some
contradictory rules.  By this I mean, all messages must
be private, and all messages must be readable.

Now, the challenges that these markets must meet point
them in the direction of having a central server doing
key escrow.  But, the central server is not allowed to
escrow the messages or be able to read the messages.

A further challenge is that these markets are full off
leakages, and so what is needed is a way of taking the
crypto capability away from users.

This solution seems to do this latter part, in that it
achieves the contradictory requirements of making every
message unreadable, but crackable, and it - in theory -
does not give users any ability to do their own crypto
and thus bypass the system.



A (purely hypothetical) example, to clarify what this
market looks like:  Imagine the NSA had to outsource
its encrypted comms.  They want all messages to be secret
because .. that's kind of their mission.  But, they are
worried about moles in the organisation, so they want
to be able to open up the whole shebang somehow and go
trolling for data.

So how do we rationalise all this?  Simple - the people
who use the system are not the people who buy the system.
The market for this system is not "users" but corporates
with special needs.  In fact if we look at the website,
it's oriented to selling into 4 markets:  corporates,
financial, health, and government,  If we ignore the
first as a catchall phrase, the remaining three all have
special needs when it comes to privacy.  And those needs
aren't so much to do with the user as with the organisation.

It was for these markets that companies like PGP Inc put
in their fabled alternate decryption key, and companies
like Hushmail sell "corporate packages."

-- 
iang

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